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Abstract
The paper explores the impact of federalism upon the performance of banking sector in
Russia. It considers how the federalist arrangement shapes the behavior of local and
regional leaders which in its turn affects the incentives of various types of banks – the
small - and medium sized local ones, Moscow banks trying to expand into the regions
and the state banks. The key claim is that Moscow as the federal centre has a more
favorable competition regime, whereas majority of the regional administrations exhibit a
paternalist treatment of banks that disrupts the competition. Consequently, Moscow is
remarkably overbanked while the regions are largely underbanked. This claim rests on
two observations: the Russian governors, despite Moscow’s attempt at liberalizing the
banking sector, are sticking to the practice of “feudal” banking when most lucrative
profit opportunities are available to the selected few. Besides that, the governors and
local leaders create administrative barriers for the banks from other regions to penetrate
the local market. The conclusion is that owing to the pitfalls of the Russian federalist
dynamics, Moscow is incapable of policing the governors’ arbitrary behavior towards
the banks. 
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Gubernatorial Patronage and the Federalism of Banking
in Russia
The formation of the institution of federalism that Russia has embarked upon after its
singling out from the body of Soviet Union has a profound impact upon its political,
economic and social realms. It represents a part of a larger state-building process which
quintessence is an attempt to dismantle the institutions of a hyper centralised Soviet
state. Particular significance of the current attempt to federalize the country stems from
the fact that federalism is a totally new institution here - tsarist Russia and the Soviet
Union were unitary states in the past.  The development of federalism therefore entails
the building of institutions and procedures with no history or tradition to back them. The
type of the system of mutual rights and responsibilities of the regions and the federal
centre that evolves in Russia creates a key political underpinning of a national market.
The  question  that  this  paper  addresses  is  how  the  current  federalist  arrangement
influences the banking sector development.
Regional  and local  leaders  represent  key players that  affect  the  banking sector.  The
strength of their influence is analogous to the one by industrial sectors, most notably,
fuel and energy. Both regional authorities and petroleum enterprises of Russia hold their
own  pocket  banks  for  the  purpose  of  servicing  their  transactions.  While  the
overwhelming influence of the fuel and energy enterprises represents a structural factor,
the  federalist  effect  or  the  way the  federalist  system  shapes  the  role  that  regional
governors play in banking represents an institutional factor that likewise mediates the
structurally  inherent  economic  conditions  and  federally  and  regionally  initiated
economic policies. 
The main finding of the research on the Russian regional politics is that the capacity of
the regional leaders for collective action is quite weak, much weaker than it is the case
with sectoral interests1. Due to that they hardly have any say in the policies affecting the
formation of banking sector on the national level, not being potent in promoting their
interests through both the Central Bank (CBR further on) and the legislature. However,
regional leaders are quite powerful locally, and on the local level they are capable of
promoting their interests towards banking. Their consistent interest, just like the one by
sectoral enterprises, lies in keeping selected banks at their pockets. This tendency has
taken  various  forms  over  time  as  a  result  of  complex  interactions  with  bankers’
community and the federal  regulators. The influence of governors upon banking has
over time formed a particular pattern that may be summarised as a patronage system. It
is an important regional institution affecting the banking sector.
As  I  intend  to  demonstrate  in  this  paper,  the  federalist  system  that  is  currently
functioning in Russia has created a particular set of incentives for the Russian regions.
On the  one  hand,  they lack  fiscal  autonomy though the  peculiar  and  rigid  taxation
system. On the other hand, they are not legally accountable to the federal centre due to
lacking mechanisms of administrative and legal control. This has lead to a situation of a
new “command” economy characterised by the possibility of arbitrary leadership style
demonstrated  by  the  regional  governors.  Fiscally  non-autonomous  regional  leaders
driven by desire to control both banks’ profit strategies and the budgetary funds have
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promoted a model of state paternalism over banking3 by trying to tie all financial flows
to  one  “pet”  regional  bank frequently called  pocket  bank.  Another  manifestation  of
paternalism has been the institution of authorised banking through which under the lack
of state treasury system all budgetary funds have been managed. Owing to this kind of
paternalist arrangement federal policy of liberalising the banking sector followed during
the  early  years  of  perestroika has  been  substantially  obstructed  locally  during  the
subsequent period.
Bradshaw  and  Treyvish  (2000)  point  out  that  the  complexity  and  diversity  of  the
Russian regional picture makes it difficult and often dangerous to generalise. However,
they sum up that the current complexity does not mean that one cannot identify key
issues that are common to all regions. It is a goal of this paper to demonstrate that the
patronage system of relationship between the banks and local authorities, as influenced
by the  current  federalist  arrangement,  is  exactly  the  kind  of  common  issue  that  is
observable throughout the entire Russia, albeit in varying degrees. As I intend to show
here, the system of patronage is the major observable factor that affects the banks’ profit
strategies and it is a direct consequence of the federalist system in the making.
Characteristics of the Russian federalist arrangement
It has been pointed out that federalism is an inherently messy institution (Tsalik, 1999).
It is particularly messy in Russia which is developing its new system of center-region
relations while at the same time it is forming a new governmental structure, is shifting
to a market economy, and is attempting to create new political, economic, and social
systems. A number of criteria have been outlined towards well-performing federalist
system, and there are few countries in the world that are able to stand up to all of the
criteria listed.
Risnes  (2001)  outlines  the  set  of  the  requirements  for  a  law-based  federation.  It
encompasses:  constitutional  protection  of  federalism;  a  legal  framework  for  the
distribution  of  powers  between  levels;  democratically  elected  legislatures  and
executives at both national and subnational level; an independent judiciary. In Russia
the framework for  the  distribution  of  powers  has  been unclear  (too  many functions
vaguely defined as "joint”). Along with that Risues argues that since 1994 the Russian
Constitutional Court has at least begun to act constructively. Apart from that, according
to Hanson and Bradshaw (2000), of the four legal requirements of a federalism listed by
Risnes, it might be said that the first and third (constitutional protection of federalism
and direct election of executives and legislatures at both national and subnational level)
are present now that regional executive leaders are all elected (in early 1997 most still
were not). The second requirement - a clear legal framework delineating the powers of
both federation and "federal subjects” - has a long way to go. The last - an independent
judiciary - is also not safely installed.
Lavrov  and  Slider  (1997)  delineate  the  economic  properties  of  a  well-functioning
federalism, which have direct relation to the issue of banking sector development that is
under  consideration  here.   These  properties  entail  the  responsibilities  of  each  level
should  be  clearly  delineated;  subnational  governments  should  have  the  means  for
primary  control  over  economic  matters  within  their  jurisdiction;  the  budgets  of
3 This concerns both the banks in partial regional state ownership and private banks. The peculiar
characteristics of this kind of paternalism make the form of ownerhip to be unimportant.
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subnational governments should be substantially independent of those at higher level;
and  transfers  between  levels  should  be  based  on  stable,  transparent  public  domain
formulae. Bradshaw and Hunson come to the conclusion that none of these conditions
have  been  met  in  1990s  Russia.  The  current  system both  de  facto  and  de  juro  is
characterised  by  overlap  and  conflict  between  agencies;  blurred  constitutional
delineation  of  responsibilities  between  centre  and  regions.  The  regions  lack  fiscal
autonomy from the centre whereas at the same time they are not accountable enough on
the legal front.
The most typical example of lacking fiscal autonomy of Russian regions is the fact that
although  one  frequently  comes  across  the  term  "budgetary federalism"  in  the  legal
documents of the Russian Federation, the actual situation in the country is a long way
from this  (Korovkin,  1996).  The  frequently arbitrary financial  policy of  the  federal
government continues to determine consolidated budgetary expenditure in the regions
(often in spite of existing legal provisions) for the following three reasons:
- the size of the transfer flowing from the federal budget to the regions is decided in
Moscow
- in order to directly withhold themselves the entire share of taxes allocated to each
region out of federal taxes, the regions require Moscow's agreement
- even the level of regional taxes can de facto scarcely be laid down without reference to
the centre.
The other side of the Russian federalism – the unaccountability of the regions to the
legal institutions – stems from a particular type of power that the regional leaders were
able to amass as a result of political transformations. The regional power in Russia rests
on two major pillars. The first is described in Polishchuk (1998); it is connected to the
overall administrative decay that the governmental apparatus has undergone as a result
of collapse of the rule by Communist Party locally. Hence the inability of the federal
state  to  provide  public  goods  it  was  supposed  to  provide  under  a  more  centralized
system of governance that existed under Communism. The provision of public goods,
especially  the  ones  related  to  social  security,  has  been  spontaneously passed  as  an
obligation to regional authorities. As a result, regional authorities, which stand for the
local  populations  as  de  facto  presidents,  possess  more  political  legitimacy than  the
federal government. Under these conditions they refuse to accept the center- regional
division of labor that characterizes other federalist structures in the world. As a result, as
Polishchuk points  out,  "the regional  authorities are turned into the  de facto  national
governments from the standpoint of their economic powers without the solid protection
of a common market for the federation". The governance of economic life in Russia is
thus characterized by a certain degree of local arbitrariness contradicting to the logic of
a single state.
The second pillar is a direct repercussion of the first one. The federal state of Russia,
lacking  adequate  political  resources  and  therefore  being  overly  dependent  on  the
regional political support, represents a model of negotiated federalism when legal space
characterizing  center-periphery  relations  is  subject  to  a  constant  lobbying  and
renegotiations (Polishchuk, 1998). The essence of negotiated federalism is described as
"the deal in which political loyalty is exchanged for authoritative powers and economic
resources".  Hence  "the  Russian  federal  system  has  been  unable  to  achieve  legal
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limitations that are rigid and binding". Despite current President's attempt at making the
rules uniform, the current federal system is characterized not only by economic, but also
by the legal separation of the subjects of the federation.
The  impact  of  federalist  dynamics  upon  banking  in  Russia  has  its  analogue  in  the
Brazilian case. Here the federalist dynamics had been unfolding over a much longer
period  of  time  than  in  Russia.  The  major  result  is  a  political-economic  regime  of
clientelismo,  which is  essentially the exchange of economic favors for votes.  Under
clientelismo "in exchange for funds to finance municipal elections, local state governors
promised to support an article in the new constitution that would provide incumbent
president Sarney a five year mandate" (Makler, 1999).
Makler (1999) presents a detailed account of the specifics of Brazilian federalism vis-à-
vis its counterparts among the more developed countries like the US. According to him,
in the latter, decentralization or yielding of some powers to the local states has been a
result  of  some established  compromise,  which  was  later  fixed  in  rigid  and binding
agreements, like Constitution. This kind of document separates powers in such a way
that a strict demarcation line is drawn between rights and responsibilities of the federal
center and the states. In Brazil,  however, similarly to Russian case, center-peripheral
relations  represent  a  symbiosis  -  decentralization  of  patrimonial  character  when  the
separation of powers is based on continuous support that the federal center offers to the
states  in  exchange  to  their  loyalty.  In  particular,  federal  center  is  selectively  and
manipulatively committed to save the subunits if they encounter financial, political or
socioeconomic problems. Neither party is fully independent from each other, and that
impedes the functioning of private economic actors. 
The picture demonstrating lack of solid and binding agreements making center and the
states fully independent from each other and fully accountable for their own area of
responsibility is quite similar in Brazil and Russia. Agreements between the center and
the  states  in  both  countries  are  arbitrary,  interactive,  and  discretionary  and  are
established  and  re-  established  on  a  case-by-case  basis.  This  kind  of  system lacks
efficiency and is costly both in time and money. Individual states in both Russia and
Brazil  are  too  powerful  so  as  successive  federal  governments  are  unwilling  and
incapable to fully coordinate the processes related to economic development - fiscal and
taxation  issues,  regulation  of  businesses  and  banks,  local  government's  spending,
uniform  upholding  of  property  rights  of  the  transacting  parties,  maintaining  of  the
uniformity of  legal  systems  and  of  their  enforcement,  and  the  like.  The  theoretical
implication of the analysis of both these cases is that certain foundations of market-
preserving federalism outlined  by Weingast  (1995)  are  missing.  There  is  no  clearly
delineated  scope  of  authority  of  each  level  of  government,  the  autonomy  of  each
government is not institutionalized in a self-enforcing way, subnational government's
regulatory responsibility over economy is frequently interfered with, and the common
market is not fully ensured. 
The resulting trait of the Russian federalist system that strongly affects banking is that
regional  leaders,  not  being bound by any legal  arrangements,  are often  very closely
linked with a dominant group of managers of large enterprises in their regions. Mokhov
(1997) calls  this  a second,  regional  version of a  command economy. It represents  a
symbiotic relationship between public politics and private capital. The nature and the
extent  of interpenetrating between regional governments and the business elites vary
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from region  to  region.  Afanasyev (1999)  suggests  that  the  degree  of  administrative
control is dependent on a region's economic power, with the common rule that weak
industry  results  in  a  weak  business  elite  and  powerful  bureaucratic  paternalism.
Normally  stronger  regions  have  more  clearly  articulated  interests,  policies  and
development models. Kagarlitski (1999) suggests that electoral fraud correlates in the
regions  with  the  tightness  of  the  relationships  between the  enterprises  and political
elites. He draws examples of Moscow and Tatarstan regions. Here the popular support
for the governors has been staying for years around 90% with the governors suspiciously
not  facing  any  opposition  in  the  legislative  bodies.  According  to  hypothesis  by
Kagarlitskii,  the local  control of the voters has also meant control  over the regional
businesses.  (Kagarlitskii,  1999).  Popkov  (2003)  also  indicates  Tatarstan  and
Bashkortostan as the regions with the lowest presence of the banks from other regions as
a result of the highest administrative barriers in the country. 
General consequences of the federalism for the banking
Poor separation of jurisdictions was noted to have more troublesome consequences on a
level of regional-local axis of power, than it has on the federal - regional axis. It has
profound  implications  for  business  and  the  banks,  which  become  hostages  of  the
conflicting local and regional levels  of power.  In this  vein,  all  large business in  the
regions is politicized, which is much less so in the federal centre. Russian banker Piotr
Aven stated in his interview of 1999 that “the dependence of business upon the state on
local  level  is  much  higher  than  it  is  on  the  federal  level”  (Kommersant-Daily,
27/01/1999). One major upshot of that for the profit strategies of the banks is that the
Moscow-based banks or  banks of federal  level  are more autonomous in their  profit
strategy than the regional banks. Hence competition on banking market is much more
intensive in Moscow than in the regions. Major proof to that is the fact that the share of
Sberbank in the regions is much higher than in Moscow since it  is much harder for
Sberbank to compete with Moscow banks than with the regional ones,  especially in
enterprise finance. Overall, the share of Sberbank in a particular region of Russia serves
as an indication of the competition regime: the share of Sberbank is the highest in the
regions and towns with the worst developed banking sector (Popkov, 2003).
The lack of clarity in separation of jurisdictions has lead to the fact that the overall level
of  the  financial  interrelations  between  the  banking  sector  and  the  Russian  regional
authorities is quite low: the share of banks’ claims on the regional authorities does not
exceed 3.5% of the assets of the banks. According to Alexei Vedev (2003), the local
budgets traditionally have low mutual financial flows with the national banking system
due to the indefinite changes in budgetary federalism that lower the structure of local
revenues and expenditures  inside  the  budget  structure.  In such  context  the  relations
between  local  authorities  and  banking system are  also  indefinite  -  the  revenue  and
expenditure side depends on federal government decisions on tax distributions and the
local administration can provide only the short-term guarantees for the banking system
to the local administration's loans. The further relations between local authorities and
the national banking will be determined by the federal fiscal policy and sovereign credit
ratings.
The vague separation of jurisdictions between different levels of power that causes the
lack  of  accountability  by  the  regional  leaders  to  any  legal  entities  perpetuates  the
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phenomenon of the command economy, which banks suffer from more than regional
enterprises  since  they  are  much  more  dependent  on  the  local  environment.  The
command economy manifests itself with respect to the banking sector in two ways: the
first one is the difficulty for cross-regional expansion that banks are experiencing and
the above-mentioned phenomenon of the regional pocket banks and the gubernatorial
patronage over banking. The support by the governors and local leaders of particular
“pet” banks means offering them particular advantages that  disrupts  the competition
between banks. 
The impact of banking federalism may be analyzed in Russia against the background of
other federalist states. In Brazil federalist system was noted to have a substantial impact
upon the banking system development. The similarity between Brazil and Russia lies in
the tendency of the local leaders to take control over the regional and local banks in both
countries. In Brazil this tendency takes the form of a resistance to bank privatization and
a substantial volume of bank assets being in regional state ownership, in Russia it is a
behind-the-scenes control of private banks by the regional leaders in addition to the
establishment by regional authorities of their own pet banks. Another consequence of
the federalist system is the tendency by the local governors to keep the banks as a source
of financing.  The last  but  not  the least,  there  exist  high barriers  to  entry which are
established by the local leaders and which result in disrupted competition regime across
the  territory of  the  countries  and  large  unevenness  between  regions  with  respect  to
intermediation market: some regions are underbanked, some are over-banked. 
An important  difference  should  be  stressed  in  regard  to  the  way federalism affects
Brazilian and Russian banking systems, though. The serious problem for the Brazilian
banking system with respect to federalism is the high domination of public banks in the
sector which "were created to finance infrastructure and nascent  entrepreneurship of
each state. For a while they preformed this role but then “their coffers were politicized
and  drained  by  their  controllers"  (Makler,  1999).  The  major  consequence  of  this
domination for the financial market is high and unregulated spending of local leaders
leading  to  budget  deficit,  with  the  highest  share  of  bank  credit  being  directed  not
towards economy but towards local government. Public banks in Brazil make 55% of all
the loans to the private and public sectors, but nearly half of these loans (45,3%) are
non-performing. Thus the major characteristics of state banks are failing health and their
increasing drain on national treasury. 
What is  observable in  Russia is  implicit  local  governments'  control  over the private
banks  which  major  consequence  is  that  banks  frequently  may  not  serve  as  market
allocators of credit.  Instead,  they allocate resources towards enterprises which are of
interest for local governments. Officially public banks in Russia do not play a major role
in the economy. However, it is aptness for financial crisis, unprotectedness of banks in
the  face  of  defaulting  borrowers,  dependence  of  local  courts  that  have  significantly
drawn private banks under implicit local state control. 
Banks in Russia’s regions: scarce opportunities for profit 
With local leaders largely lacking fiscal autonomy, commercial banks are among the
few institutions  in Russia that have financial resources available for investment. The
private banking capital  tends to concentrate in the following most advanced Russian
regions: Central Russia (around Moscow), the Urals, the Volga region and the Far East.
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The concentration of capital in large cities of European part of Russia is overwhelming.
According to the data supplied by the president of the ARB Tosunian, out of 1300 banks
in Russia more than 600 of them are linked to Moscow, and only 700 to the rest of
Russia. Moscow embraces 70-80% of an entire capital which makes it almost 90% in
conjuncture with the “second capital” Saint-Petersburg. Tosunian draws the example of
Voronezh oblast which territory is equal to that of France and which with the population
of  2.5  million  people  is  being  serviced  by 34  banks  including  State  Savings  Bank
(Sberbank) branches. Here similar over-concentration tendency is observed: 90% of the
banks are concentrated in the key city or around it4. 
Two tendencies have been pointed out in this respect:
- A division is taking place among the regions into those where the financial system is
developing according to market principles through leading Russian banks (and in the
future Western ones as well) and the regions which are dominated by the politicized and
largely uncompetitive pocket banks of the governors
- A sharp differentiation between the regions is emerging according to the extent to
which their banks are prepared to extend credits to industrial enterprises.
Speaking about the general layout of the banking business in the typical Russian region,
the following account by the leading banker of Sverdlovsk region is quite characteristic. 
“The picture of the client market looks rather structured. The largest and most
lucrative enterprises as in any territory of Russia are owned in our region by
Moscow-owned  companies  and  enterprises.  It  is  natural  enough  that  all
financial flows related to these enterprises are directed towards Moscow banks
which  are  usually  a  part  of  larger  business  groups.  Classic  example  is
Uralmash (Machines of  Urals)  plant.  The most  significant  part  of  its  finance
goes  through  Industrial  Trade  Bank  owned  by  the  Plant.  …Recently,  MDM
business  group  has purchased  Sevrdlovsk Pipe  Factory,  it  is  natural  that  it
would  redirect  all  the  financial  flows  towards  the  banks  situated  in
Moscow...There  is  a  number  of  mineral-resource-related  enterprises  in
Sverdlovsk region which mostly cooperate with petroleum banks. Gazprombank
is  strictly  related  to  the  enterprises  of  gas  industry.  It  is  not  that  other
enterprises are of no interest to it; it is that all its assets are concentrated within
the gas field.  The regional  enterprises of  defence industry usually cooperate
with  the  federal  state  banks.  The  remaining  business  opportunities  on  the
territory of our region are a niche for local banks. Banks like that control over
15% of the region’s banking assets”. (Expert, July 2001)
In the light of the above-mentioned scarcity of profit opportunities that regional banks
face  their  situation  is  particularly  dramatic  in  the  richest  and  economically  most
developed among Russian regions.  The local  banks occupy a  clearly small  niche in
resource-rich and/or economically advanced regions of Russia which are attractive to
Moscow -  based  banks  that  squeeze  the  regional  banks  out  of  the  most  promising
markets. The financial crisis of 1998 has had Moscow banks have been severely hurt,
which allowed the regional banks to expand their activities. The crisis also served as a
stimulus for the regional authorities to promote their patronage model in banking since
this kind of patronage would support the banks in the face of economic instability and
4 Interview with Garegin Tosunian, BDM, available from http://arb.rosweb.ru/page.php?id=17&d_id=13
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offer them additional profit opportunities. The most widely spread practice with regard
to the patronage model  looked the following: in return for the transfer of a bulk of
private banks' shares to regional authorities, the later would place their accounts with
the bank. This  happened in Saint  Petersburg where the Yakovlev administration has
taken equity stakes  in  four  of  the  largest  local  banks  (Balt-Uneximbank,  Petrovskii
bank, Promstroibank and Bank Sankt-Peterburg). Similar action has been taken by one
of the regional governors among the cases considered here: the governor of Omsk oblast
Leonid Polezhaev has  committed  a  public  act  of transferring treasury finances  from
local Sberbank into Omskpomstrojbank in November 2001. 
The patronage system of relationship established between the regional leaders and the
banks is limited by the economic structure of the region. Russian regional landscape
represents a "leopard skin economy" with drastically divergent economic fortunes of the
regions5.  Economic  winners  and losers have a diverging degree of involvement into
Russia's financial system. Regions endowed with resources or having a strong industrial
base tend to be less ignored by Moscow-based banks. Losers from among the regions
tend  to  be  more  isolated  from  the  financial  shocks.  Thus,  more  complex  regional
economy tends  to  weaken  the  patronage  system,  make  it  less  predominant  form of
banks' regional functioning6.
The table below outlines the share of various types of banks on various banking markets
of Russia. It allows evaluating the profit strategies of the regional banks in Russia vis-à-
vis their Moscow counterparts, both in the federal centre and in the regions. 
5 Sam Vaknin describes these diverging fortunes in the following way:
In an IMF working paper (Regional Disparities and Transfer Policies in Russia by Dabla-Norris and
Weber), the authors note that the 10 wealthiest regions produce more than 40% of Russia's GDP - and
contribute more than 50% of its tax revenues - thus heavily subsidizing their poorer brethren. Output
contracted by 90% in some regions, and by only 15% in others. Moscow, with less than 7% of the
population, receives more than 20% of all federal funds. In the Tuva republic, three-quarters of the
denizens are poor, compared to less than a fifth in Moscow. Moscow lavishes on each of its residents 30
times the amount per capita spent by the poorest region. In some regions, the movers and shakers are
oligarch-tycoons, but in others, businessmen formed enterprise associations, akin to special interest
lobbying groups in the West. Inevitably such incestuous relationships promote corruption, impose
conformity, inhibit market mechanisms and foster detachment from the centre. But they also prevent
internecine fighting and open, economically-devastating, investor-deterring conflicts. Economic policy in
such parts of Russia tends to be coherent and efficiently implemented. Such business-political complexes
reached their apex in 1992-1998 in Moscow (ranked number 1 in creditworthiness), Samara, Tyumen,
Sverdlovsk, Tatarstan, Perm, Nizhny-Novgorod, Irkutsk, Krasnoyarsk, and St Petersburg (Putin's lair). As
a result, by early 1997, Moscow attracted over 50% of all FDI and domestic investment, and St.
Petersburg another 10%. Russia is at a crossroad. It must choose which of the many models of federalism
to adopt. It can either strengthen the center at the expense of the regions, transforming the latter into mere
tax collectors and law enforcement agents - or devolve more powers to tax and spend to the regions. The
pendulum swings. Putin appears sometimes to be an avowed centralist - and at other times a liberal.
Contrary to reports in the Western media, Putin failed to subdue the regions. The donors and exporters
among them are as powerful as ever. But he did succeed to establish a modus vivendi and is working hard
on a modus operandi. He also weeded out the zanier governors. Russia seems to be converging on
equilibrium of sorts - though, as usual, it is a precarious one.”
6 That is not to say the Russia’s richest regions do not hold pocket banks – quite the opposite: Tatarstan,
Bashkiria and the Moscow municipality are clear evidence to the fact that governors of rich regions
exhibit a uniform kind of patronage strategy. Richer regions, however, have a better environment for
other, non-pocket banks to function.
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Table 1. The share of various types of banks in banking market niches, in per cent
Bank group Sberbank “Petroleum”
banks
Large
federal
banks
State
banks
Foreign
Banks
Moscow
small and
medium-
sized
banks
Regional
banks - all
Regional
banks –
top 100
Regional
banks -
small
Number of
banks in a
group
1 17 16 8 26 602 653 100 554
Household
deposits,
short-term
70% 5% 7% 5% 1% 4% 8% 6% 2%
Household
deposits,
long-term
48 8 13 4 7 7 13 10 3
Accounts of
legal entities
19 13 17 12 6 21 13 9 4
Short-term
accounts of
legal entities
12 18 23 12 7 19 10 7 3
Loans to
enterprises
28 11 20 10 7 14 11 7 3
Loans to
households
42 4 18 2 4 19 11 6 5
Securities 49 9 10 11 6 10 4 4 1
Source: Popkov (2003)
The banks in the regions extend fewer loans than federal banks and Sberbank, so their
role in enterprise finance may not be considered remarkable. However, their share in
holding household deposits is significant (8% of the market for short-term deposits and
13% of the market for long-term) as compared to other types of banks. This indicates a
tendency of regional  banks to be “closer” to  the households  than Moscow banks of
federal level, hence Moscow banks’ interest in acquisition of regional banks with a well-
developed affiliate network.
Moscow banks in the regions
The key reason why the Moscow banks tend to enter the regions is the presence there of
investment-needy enterprises.  The  regional  banks  tend  to  lag  drastically  behind  the
Moscow banks in regard to their financial capacities, and in particular in one important
dimension: the maximum amount of loan they are able to extend to a single borrower.
Thus in majority of regions dominated by large enterprises the regional banks are not
able to work with the largest and the most profitable borrowers.
Another  attractive  side  of  the  regions  for  Moscow  banks  is  the  unexploited  profit
opportunities  on  the  retail  market.  In  this  case  Moscow  banks  purchase  the  most
promising regional banks with a well - developed affiliate network.
As I will discuss below in regard to the institution of authorised banking, Moscow banks
have been important allies of the regional governors at the outset of Russia’s economic
transition. During the early and the mid 1990s with barter transactions dominating the
economy Moscow banks had a substantial leverage due to their financial capacities that
could help to alleviate barter and political power that allowed them to participate in
privatisation  of  the  regional  enterprises.  Later  on,  however,  as  Moscow banks  have
suffered from the financial crisis and as it became increasingly obvious that they tend to
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siphon off the funds from the regions, the governors started to treat them with greater
scepticism and to rely more upon the local banks.
As a result,  Moscow banks’ operations are tied to the enterprises that related to the
banks through cross-ownership. These enterprises tend to function in the richest of the
Russian regions. Well-developed banking sector is to be found in the wealthiest among
Russian  regions,  with  the  poorer  ones  being  underbanked.  When  asked  during  an
interview if his bank had any problems with regional authorities creating obstacles to
the banks’ operations, the bank manager representing a bank that was rather active in
regional expansion has answered that he had no problems in the five regions of Russia
where the bank expanded, but he added that this was because the bank had expanded
into regions  where the  key bank’s  shareholders and clients  were situated.  Thus,  the
rather opportunistic and arbitrary behavior of regional leaders towards the banks makes
the latter even more dependent on enterprises, without whose support banks might not
function. Here we see that the banks’ dependency on enterprises has not only economic
and financial, but also political reasons.
The usual way to overcome these regional constraints for Moscow banks is to buy out
the regional ones. Sometimes regional banks have little value per se, however their links
to  local  enterprises  and political  structures  is  what  attracts  the  Moscow banks.  One
recent example is the purchase by Moscow’s MDM of Uralo-Siberian Bank (USSB) in
Urals  region and Sverdlovsk oblast  and Petrovski Narodni Bank in Saint Petersburg
region in 2001 – 2002. MDM has directly stated that in case of Uralo-Sibisrkii bank it
aspires to establish “working relationship” with Sverdlovsk administration7.
Influence on elections
The history of interrelationships between the Moscow banks and the regional players
unfolds around two important episodes. The first one concerns their influence upon the
local elections. The most notable instance was a support by the Oneksim Bank of 1998
St.  Petersburg  mayoral  candidate  Vladimir  Yakovlev,  who  in  return  has  offered  a
support to business operations of Baltoneksim bank (a part of Oneksim bank in North-
Western region of Russia) on the territory of the city8. In particular, Baltoneksim bank
got  access  to  budget  accounts  and  got  involved  into  servicing  budget-related
transactions.  A  number  of  other  banks  have  also  featured  in  the  regional  electoral
campaigns.
Moscow banks as authorised banks
Another important episode on the nexus of banking and politics concerns the institution
of authorised banking that starting from 1993 and throughout Yeltsin’s reign has been a
legally established institution that would allow a regional or municipal government to
arbitrarily select a particular commercial  bank through which it  would carry out the
state-budget-related transactions.  St.  Petersburg mayor Yakovlev after  his  experience
with  Baltoneksimbank  has  decided  to  support  the  competition  of  banks  for  state
budgetary funds in the form of official bidding. Contrary to his expectations this kind of
bidding has  unleashed a  fight  between various  banking institutions,  in  particular  an
7 Shuvalov (2002)
8 In detail this episode is analyzed in reports that are available from:
http://www.ancentr.ru/doklads/archive/ispi19.htm
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organized fight by banks against Baltoneksimbank. Besides, the banks that lost in the
tender, started to team with the Yakovlev’s political opposition represented by ex-mayor
Anatolii Sobchak and some representatives of the Communist party (various parts of the
opposition  were pushing for  Yakovlev’s  impeachment  at  the time)  and render  them
financial support.  Alarmed by these consequences of a competition policy, Yakovlev
had  to  turn  all  municipal  budgetary accounts  to  the  local  department  of  CBR.  The
banks’ lobby has been so strong that later on the Yakovlev administration was forced to
cut any financial transactions with Baltoneksim bank.
Along with the city of St. Petersburg, Leningrad oblast administration has also initiated
around 1997 a rather scandalous bidding for work with budgetary funds. As a result
several winners were selected:  two Moscow banks (Inkombank and Rossiiskii Kredit),
2 Petersburg banks (Petroagroprombank and Promstojbank) and the local department of
Sberbank.  The bidding process  has  allowed the administration to  make the rules  of
cooperation with the banks more stringent. The bidding would demand from the winner
bank to  finance  various  municipal  programs at  the  rate  3-5 points  lower  than  CBR
refinancing rate.
The institution of authorised banking in its form offered by regional leaders turned out
to  be  incompatible  with  commercial  bankers’  interests,  even  among  those  formally
representing  the  state  banks.  Not  all  the  above  mentioned  banks  have  signed  an
agreement  with  the  local  administration.  The  reason  for  that  was  that  this  kind  of
agreement  would stipulate  the  entering of  state  representatives  into bank’s  board of
directors in exchange for budgetary funds. Several of the banks thus resisted the kind of
patronage  relationship  that  was  offered  by  the  local  government.  Similar  legal
arrangement that would allow the mayor to exert its full control over the banks’ profit
policy in exchange for access to municipal funds has been prepared by the Moscow
municipal administration. This project has not been supported by commercial banks that
saw the payment for the opportunity to work with municipal finances to be too high.
Thus, authorised banking is  one of the forms of the patronage of local  leaders over
banks. 
As an outcome, mounting pressures have lead to signing by Yeltsin of a decree that
would abolish the institution of authorised banking (the decree was prepared by a leader
of SPS (Union of Right Forces) political party Boris Nemtsov who saw the authorised
banking as the perpetuation of oligarchic capitalism in Russia). The decree signed by
Yeltsin had a compromising character and it has mostly hit the Moscow banks: it would
abolish the authorised banking on federal and regional level, but would not stipulate the
mechanisms by means of which the banks should work with municipal budgetary funds.
This  loophole  would later  allow a number  of  regional  administrations  to  keep their
pocket banks intact.
On  the  whole,  however,  the  policy  of  abolishing  the  authorised  banking  and  the
appearance of the state treasury system has  hurt  those regional  banks that  had local
budgetary funds as a substantial part of their liabilities. Nonetheless, the credibility of
federal  policy aimed to  abolish  the  collusion between the  local  administrations  and
banks was undermined: before the treasury system started to  function,  all  budgetary
accounts  were  transferred  into  the  federal  state  bank  Sberbank.  Thus,  the  federal
government was willing to prohibit the regions what it has allowed to itself. This policy
in  the  field  of  banking,  similarly  to  many  other  areas  of  attempted  separation  of
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economic jurisdictions, has undermined the mutual trust of the federal and the regional
governments.
Difficulties of the regional survival
The opportunistic  and arbitrary behavior  of  regional  leaders  perpetuated by Russian
federalist system, creates problems for the Moscow banks to survive in the regions. Here
is the example of one Moscow bank’s behavior under the circumstances. The Siberian
Farmers’ Bank was created in the beginning of the 1990s to work with farms on the
territory of Western Siberia (Vedomosti, August 22, 2003). It has undergone a frequent
change of the shareholders, and by the end of the 1990s it  ended up in the hands of
Moscow – based trade company, that intended to expand its operations into Western
Siberia, in particular to Novosibirsk region. The expansion of business did not work out,
with Moscow businessmen nevertheless trying to continue to work with the regionally-
based bank. However, it did not work out either and they were forced to close down the
bank in Western Siberia and to transfer it to Moscow, to a great astonishment of the
banking community. Bank management has  explained the move by two reasons:  no
opportunity of growth for the bank in the region despite hard attempts at its business
development and lack of proper business partners in the region on which the bank could
base its operations. This case demonstrates that due to a political regime in the regions
Moscow was and still is much more favorable location for business development.
Regional Pocket Banks
With the arrival of a new management team to the banking division of CBR the later
together with the Ministry for Antimonopoly Policy (MAP) has announced that it is not
only State Savings Bank Sberbank that violates the antimonopoly provisions9, but also
the major part of Russia’s regional banks (Vedomosti, September 5, 2003). MAP has
announced that almost  all  regional  banks enjoy a monopoly position on the selected
territories of Russian Federation. MAP had a particular claim against a Bank of Moscow
which is  the primary financial  organization  to deal  with the  Moscow municipality’s
budget funds.
This joint statement by MAP and CBR has acknowledged the reality of regional pocket
banking that existed throughout the nineties with the tacit silence of regulatory bodies in
regard  to  the  violation  by  the  regional  banks  of  anti-monopoly  provisions,  single-
borrower exposure limits and other prudential norms. Certain regional cases, like the
one of Bashkortostan, are more noticeable in press due to a better developed economy of
the region and more financially powerful local banks, whereas others are less noticeable
due to their minor importance. However, the reality of pocket banking pertains to both
the regions with a well and badly developed financial system.
UraloSibirskii  Bank  (formerly  Bashkredit)  is  entangled  with  the  Bashkortostan
Republic’s Management with the Republic having in its ownership 37.5% of its shares.
The rest of the shares are owned by 700 legal entities with none of them holding more
than 5  % of  the  stock.  Its  retail  network  is  the  third strongest  in  the  country after
Sberbank and Siberian OVK, and includes 300 outlets. During the entire year of 2003
there were rumours on bank’s stock being sold to the entities outside of their Republic.
9 Sberbank, that enjoys the state guarantee on the household deposits, has been accused on numerous
occasions of violating the anti-monopoly provisions.
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However, the involvement of the bank into political matters made this sale difficult. The
state inspection of the bank has demonstrated certain  violations,  which were caused
primarily by disagreements between the regional and federal laws. In particular, Ural
Sib was operating in the legal form, which Russian law prohibits (Barsukova, 2003).
15% of  bank’s  shares  have  been  finally  sold  to  the  large  investment  conglomerate
Nikoil. Analysts point out that the rationale for a swift sale of the shares of the banking
so tightly controlled by regional administration have to do with oncoming gubernatorial
elections with Bahskir leader Rakhimov being uncertain in the outcome of the elections
and  consequently  over  the  financial  flows  going  through  the  bank  (Vedomosti,  21
October 2003). 
In accordance with the logic of a new command economy, the regional banks become
the  frequent  hostages  of  the  pre-electoral  fight.  Omsk  region  has  witnessed  a  fight
between Omsk Mayor Valerii Roshupkin and the current governor Leonid Polezhaev
(Vasilchenko, 1999).  In the course of this fight the businesses of the city of Omsk,
which population is 1.2 million people versus 1 million of inhabitants residing within
the rest of the region, were forced to pay taxes to the region and not to the city. This way
the  electoral  campaign  was  serving  its  goal  of  depriving  the  Omsk  mayor  as  the
competitor of any financial support. The share of the city in the region’s consolidated
budget started to get drastically lower during the pre-election period: from 50% during
the entire 90s, it went down to 33% in 1998 and yet down to 24% in 1999 – the year of
gubernatorial  elections.  In  summer  of  1998  the  city  of  Omsk  has  been  suddenly
abandoned by the two major taxpayers: Sibneft’ oil company and the liquor-producing
plant  Osha.  These  companies  have  just  changed  their  place  of  registration,  thus
depriving  the  city  of  Omsk  of  227  billion  roubles  of  taxes.  Since  both  of  these
enterprises were considered to be close to the governor Polezhaev, this step of theirs
was considered a strategic pre-electoral action. 
The next step in the pre-election fight has been attacking the banks and businesses close
to the Omsk mayor under the aegis of fight against crime. These banks and enterprises
were subject to constant tax inspections; in particular the office of IT bank headed by
vice-mayor of Omsk Vladimir Volkov has been visited frequently by various inspecting
organs.  As a consequence,  the bank started losing its clients. The highest  point  the
banking  scandal  has  reached  when  Volkov  was  prohibited  to  leave  the  region  and
accused  of financial  misdealing.  The  media  outlets  supporting Roshupkin  have  also
been harassed. Roshupkin has stated in his electoral interview that this problem plagues
not only the region of Omsk but a large number of regions of Russia: Sverdlovsk region,
Kalmykia, Altai, Tiva. “Today the local government fights with the regional authorities
for the financial flows and control over the assets. The sharing of assets has been fixed
only on paper, the actual mechanisms of this separation are not working…The most
serious conflicts arise over the land and property.” According to Roshupkin, in order to
avoid these fights, the corresponding divisions should be signed similar to ones signed
between  the  federal  centre  and  the  subjects  of  Russian  Federation.  According  to
Roshupkin, oncoming presidential elections complicate the cleavages within the region
to even a higher degree, since the fight is exacerbated by the fighting of those supporting
and opposing the current President.
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Regional banks as authorised banks
The local leaders in Russia have been quite ambivalent about the role of regional banks
as authorised banks. The leaders of richer Russian regions, like the City of Moscow or
Tatarstan, have early on developed their definite preference for using the institution of
authorised  banking  in  order  to  manage  the  local  budgetary  funds,  and  to  use  the
regional, and not Moscow banks of federal significance for that purpose. Having said
that, it is important to point out that richer regions had better chances of having stronger
and better-capitalised banks,  thus  governors’  desire  to  control  them was dictated by
important financial leverage being at stake. 
Along with that, the governors of the poorer regions, like for example Moscow oblast
(Podmoskovje)  governor  Anatolii  Tiazhlov,  have  been  more  ambivalent  about
entrusting the budgetary funds to local  commercial  banks,  even if  authorized ones10.
According to Tiazhlov, “in order to regulate the budgetary flows one should establish
regional  treasury banks.  Thus  the  commercial  banks,  through which  disappeared  so
many budgetary resources and funds with such a difficulty collected from enterprises
and the population, should be detached from the budgetary funds whatsoever”. 
Policy of the banks trying to tackle the regional politics
Facing the situation of the lack of possibility to develop without the political support,
banks themselves attempt to forge alliances with the regional power. Rather amusing
example may be found in the political life of Sverdlovsk region. In winter 2002 the
Sverdlovsk Regional Bank (Sverdlovskii Gubernskii Bank) decided to offer the oblast
Duma 25% of its shares as a gift. The total cost of a ‘gift’ amounts to 80 million rubles.
The shares to be offered as a gift belonged to 5 companies-bank’s shareholders. The
rationale of a gift has been an attempt by a major bank’s shareholder, half-state-owned
company Gosinkor, to expand its business in Sverdlovsk region in military defense area.
Another rationale has been a desire by the Gosinkor to see the regional government
controlling the financial flows coming through Sverdlovsk Regional Bank, in particular
in  connection  with  financing  the  construction  of  Beloyarsk  atomic  power  station
(BAES). The Duma deputies, afraid of some trap hidden behind this 80-million gift,
have declined the offering11.
Policy of regional leaders trying to go around the pressure by federal
government to “let the banks go”
Partial return of authorized banking
The federal government, after curbing any attempt by Moscow banks to collude with
local governments, has been also repeatedly trying, through legislative means or through
actions  by  CBR,  to  curb  the  regional  governors’  inclination  to  keep  the  regional
commercial banks at their pockets.
However, the regional bankers along with the regional leaders fought back by requesting
the Duma to legislatively allow them to return the budgetary money through commercial
banks (Lampadov, 2002).  The Duma in defiance of the government determination has
10 Tiazhlov’s position on this matter is available from:
http://www.mosreg.ru/pgobladm/nov98/nov3009_3.htm
11  Newsline of Febuary 22, 2002, available from www.regions.ru
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been receptive to this request – 300 deputies supported this amendment. The essence of
legislative amendment has been permitting the regional commercial banks of the regions
that do not receive the financial support from the federal centre (the total number of
such regions is 14) to open at  commercial banks the special accounts to process the
transactions  with  the  state  securities.  According  to  the  amendment,  if  the  bank  is
selected on the competitive basis, the banks with 50% of regional ownership should be
allowed to service the state budgetary transactions. This way, the regional leaders have
managed to partially reverse the so painfully won achievement of 1992 that banned the
commercial banks to operate with the state budgetary funds and to transfer these funds
into the state treasury.  This prohibition was considered an important step on the way of
subjecting the regions to fiscal discipline and transparency. Only those regions were
allowed to keep their funds at commercial banks which did not have CBR departments
on their territory. The amendment of 2002 on the contrary concerns the richest of the
regions. Even though it only concerns the right of the regional governments to deal with
the  state  securities  through  the  selected  commercial  banks,  it  involves  virtually the
entire market of borrowings, which in case of big cities is quite substantial: in Moscow
it is 12 billion rubles annually, in Saint Petersburg 13 billion, in Bashkiria 3 billion. This
amendment  meant  allowing  the  regional  leaders  to  keep  in  their  pocket  banks  the
substantial funds away from the federal scrutiny, with the most plausible goal of these
funds  to  be  directed  towards  financing  local  electoral  campaigns,  as  well  as
strengthening the regional pocket banks vis-à-vis the Moscow ones by offering them
such a lucrative profit instrument. The four most salient regional pocket banks that were
making headlines as a means of regional leaders non-transparent financial transactions
have  been  the  banks  of  the  richest  regions:  Moscow  Bank,  PromStrojBank  Saint
Petersburg, Uralo- Sibisrkij Bank and Tatarstan’s Ak Bars. The governor of one of the
relatively well-off regions - Samara - Konstantin Titov has confessed that the region has
been  making  good  money  by  keeping  40%  of  the  budgetary  funds  in  Sberbank,
Gazprombank, Samarskij Kredit Bank and Solidarity Bank. The analysts have pointed
out that the amendment has largely been pushed through by the largest banks – Bank of
Moscow, Baltoneksimbank (Saint Petersburg), Uralsib, AK Bars and others12.
The earlier attempts by the regional leaders to bypass any federal provisions and to exert
the control over the local banking sector by focusing upon one pocket banks has been
exemplified by the policy of a notoriously famous governor of Kursk oblast Alexander
Rutskoi  who has established his KGB bank that would control all  the export-import
transactions  of  the  region,  assemble  all  tax  payments  and  all  the  mutual  payments
between  enterprises  and  carry  out  all  regional  investment  programmes  (Analytical
centre, 1997). Other example has been ethnic Republic of Tatarstan that witnessed a
merger  of  four  major  banks  (Tatfondbank,  AK  Bars,  Volzhsko-Kamskii  and
Tatinfrabank) under the aegis of regional administration.
Selling the state property to oneself
Another remarkable strategy used by the regional leaders in order to retain the control
over the well-performing banks was described by a famous banker Sergej Veremeenko
who was involved into ownership of Bashkir Republic’s key regional pocket bank and
had a lot of struggle with the regional administration over the terms of ownership and
12 The full description of this episode may be found at: http://iip.ru/news/news1.php?n=159&all=1
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the profit strategy of the bank and the oil enterprise in common ownership. Veremeenko
reports that after the pressure of the federal state on the regional government to sell the
state shares in regional banking, which the federal regulators thought to be too high, the
Bashkir regional government has undergone a series of operations through which they
essentially prepared the property to be sold to itself (Ivanov, 2003).  
Conclusion
The federalism of banking has its impact upon both federal and regional banks. Both of
these types of banks have had a history of cooperation with local and regional leaders,
with many of them being the winners of the governors’ preferential policy. However,
the tide has later turned against all of them since the patronage system creates serious
inhibitions  for  the  banks’  exploiting  the  regional  profit  opportunities.  The  Russian
governors, despite Moscow’s attempt at liberalizing the banking sector, are sticking to
the practice of “feudal” banking when most lucrative profit opportunities are available
to the selected few. In chaos accompanying the Russian federalist dynamics, Moscow is
incapable  of  policing  the  governors’  arbitrary  behavior  towards  the  banks.  As  a
consequence, the regional economies are the ones that lose the most: regional banks lack
the conditions for the development, and Moscow banks are dependent on enterprises’
business in the regions. As an outcome, Moscow remains the place with the far better
developed financial system than the rest of the country.
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